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Abstract
This paper examines the flexibility of multinational firms to use income-shifting
strategies within a tax year to react to operating losses. We develop a theoretical
model that considers how affiliate losses can be adjusted ex post (i.e., after financial
outcomes are revealed) or ex ante (i.e., before financial outcomes are revealed) by
using transfer prices and internal debt. Our model predicts that under ex-post
income shifting, loss affiliates have lower transfer prices and internal leverage than
profitable affiliates, whereas under ex-ante income shifting, affiliates feature the
same transfer prices and internal capital structure, regardless of making losses.
Using data on direct transfer payments and internal debt of Norwegian affiliates,
we find empirical evidence that, under losses, transfer pricing provides flexibility
to adjust income shifting ex post, while we do not find evidence for flexibility in
the use of internal debt to shift income ex post. Our study extends prior literature
on income shifting that focuses largely on profitable firms and does not consider
transfer pricing and internal debt shifting concurrently.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, tax avoidance using income shifting between affiliates of multinational
companies has become a hotly debated issue among policymakers and academics. In its
“Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” (BEPS) report, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) (2013) confirms that profit shifting is a substantial
issue and states that “at stake is the integrity of the corporate income tax”(p. 8). The
OECD identifies transfer pricing and debt shifting as the two main strategies for shifting
income from high-tax to low-tax countries. The use of both devices to reduce multination-
als’ overall tax payments is an important topic examined in the accounting, finance, and
economics literatures.1 However, policymakers and the academic literature have largely
ignored income-shifting strategies in firms that incur losses.
Our paper contributes to this debate by considering income shifting under losses and
analyzing the degree of flexibility in two income-shifting mechanisms: transfer pricing
and internal debt. By doing so, we add to the literature on income shifting that rarely
considers the effect of loss-making affiliates within a multinational firm. In particular,
Klassen et al. (1993) discuss distinctive features of affiliates with net operating losses
and point out that there is an incentive to shift income into such affiliates. However,
the authors drop loss-making affiliates in their main sample, instead of testing for their
characteristics.2 Using IRS panel data on US companies from 1980 to 1987, Grubert
et al. (1993) estimate that roughly 50% of the return-rate difference between foreign
and domestically controlled firms is attributable to tax-induced transfer pricing. The
authors point out that foreign-controlled firms not only disclose significantly less taxable
income, but also consistently achieve profitability to be concentrated around zero, with
significantly less deviations compared to domestic firms. This result is taken as indirect
evidence supporting the presence of active income shifting, yet the role of losses in income
shifting remains unclear.
Maydew (1997) examines inter-temporal loss shifting in U.S. firms after the 1986
Tax Reform Act reduced corporate tax rates substantially. He finds that expenses were
shifted back to the higher U.S. tax rate regime, consistent with incentives to report higher
losses if they can be settled immediately against highly taxed income. Erickson et al.
(2013) find similar loss-shifting behavior over a longer period (1981-2010) during which
1For a general overview, see Gresik (2001), Shackelford and Shevlin (2001), Go¨x and Schiller (2007),
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), and Mintz and Weichenrieder (2010). Huizinga et al. (2008) and Møen et
al. (2011) introduce external debt shifting. See Blouin et al. (2014) for a discussion of thin capitalization
rules related to internal debt shifting.
2Dropping loss firms became the dominant empirical strategy in (almost) all papers on both trans-
fer pricing and debt shifting in order to, seemingly, avoid any bias from reversed incentives under net
operating losses. Some studies include loss-making firms in their robustness analysis, but the focus is
still mainly on firms making profits without isolating the role of flexibility (e.g., Dharmapala and Riedel
2013). When we take into account that 38% of the observations for MNCs in our data run losses, it seems
puzzling that loss-making affiliates receive so little attention.
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firms accelerated loss recognition when their allowable carryback period was set to expire.
However, the availability of loss carrybacks has been massively limited both in magnitude
and in time (mostly to one year) in the last 15 years, especially in European countries.
The reduction of opportunities to shift losses inter -temporally makes intra-temporal loss
shifting important to identify and understand.
Only a very small literature directly examines intra-temporal income shifting in the
presence of losses. Gramlich et al. (2004) and Onji and Vera (2010) analyze income-
shifting behavior within domestic Japanese trusts (‘keiretsus’) and find evidence that net
operating losses in some Japanese affiliates are balanced by shifting in income from other
Japanese affiliates. Onji and Vera credit this behavior to tax motives that arise from the
fact that the Japanese corporate income tax did not provide group provision in order to
consolidate keiretsus’ overall taxable income. De Simone et al. (2015) examine whether
the unexplained income of loss affiliates is correlated with tax-related factors. They find
that both the potential tax savings and ability of profitable affiliates to contribute profits
to loss affiliates affect unexplained profits (losses). However, these studies do not consider
and compare the flexibility and effect of losses on internal debt shifting or transfer pricing
strategies concurrently, including the role of intangible assets. In addition, they neither
identify the mechanisms for intra-temporal income shifting, nor analyze firms’ ability to
react to new information about profit or loss realization.
Importantly, our study examines the flexibility of multinational firms to use income-
shifting strategies – whether using transfer pricing or internal debt – within a tax year
to react to operating losses. We define flexibility as the ability for a firm to adjust its
income-shifting strategies after new information on financial performance outcomes is
revealed within a tax year. We refer to this activity as flexibility to shift ex post. Lack of
flexibility, i.e., that firms must commit to their income-shifting strategies before having
information about their financial performance, is referred to as ex-ante income shifting.
We begin by setting up a model of a multinational company that owns affiliates in n
countries and hosts a profit and financial center in a tax haven. The tax-haven affiliate uses
its equity to lend internal debt to the other related affiliates. It charges them user fees for
a fixed factor (e.g., royalties on technology) and serves as a vendor, buying an intermediate
good at the world market price and reselling it with a mark-up to the productive affiliates
(e.g., the Apple Sales International case, see Levin and McCain 2013). Thus, our model
captures income shifting by transfer pricing both in intangibles and intermediate tangible
goods, as well as internal debt shifting. Shocks to the sale price of the final good introduce
the risk of incurring net operating losses at the end of the tax year.
The theoretical model suggests that flexibility in income-shifting strategies has crucial
implications for firm behavior in achieving tax-efficient income reporting under losses. If
firms have little flexibility, they are forced to adjust their income-shifting strategies ex
ante, i.e., at the beginning of the year. For that purpose, they must consider the likelihood
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of incurring losses by the end of the year before financial outcomes are observed. However,
if firms have (some) flexibility, they can adjust their income-shifting strategies ex post, i.e.,
they can wait to observe financial outcomes before considering whether and how much
income to shift between affiliates. One important insight from this model is that the
standard procedure of dropping loss-making affiliates in empirical studies only works well
if there is substantial flexibility in income shifting. If an income-shifting strategy features
inflexibility, the procedure of dropping loss-making affiliates will not cure the estimation
bias. Ignoring loss expectations when firms are inflexible will lead to an underestimation
of the true effect even if the sample only includes profitable firms. This occurs because,
ex ante, all firms face the same trade-off by taking into account loss expectations and
hence this is also true for ex-post profitable firms.
We empirically explore flexibility in income shifting using a firm-level panel data set
of all Norwegian based firms’ tax returns during 1998-2005. The key advantage of the
Norwegian data is that we can directly observe incoming and outgoing transfer payments
between affiliates, as well as measure internal leverage ratios by affiliate, over time.3 We
separately regress intra-firm transfer payments and internal leverage ratios on an indicator
variable equal to one if the firm experiences a loss position in that year, and control for a
variety of other factors that may explain income shifting, including past profitability as a
proxy for ex-ante expectations. If being in a loss position significantly reduces affiliates’
net outgoing transfer payments and internal leverage in the current year, then we infer
that at least some flexibility exists to shift income ex post.
The empirical results indicate that multinational firms exert flexibility in adjusting
their transfer pricing ex post, i.e., after receiving information on financial performance,
but before the end of the year. In particular, we find that, compared to profitable af-
filiates, loss affiliates make smaller outgoing transfer payments to other affiliates within
the multinational company.4 Further analysis indicates that firms have more flexibility to
adjust transfer prices for intangible than for tangible goods. In addition, we find evidence
consistent with changes in transfer prices, rather than underlying firm performance or
weak customer demand, explaining the smaller net outgoing transfer payments of loss
firms.
On the contrary, we do not find evidence for flexibility in the use of internal debt.
However, since the estimates are imprecise, we cannot definitively rule out that some
ex-post shifting in internal debt takes place. We also note that since smaller outgoing
transfer payments and lower internal leverage reduce the risk of experiencing a loss, our
3Prior research largely identifies income shifting indirectly by regressing the foreign affiliate profitabil-
ity on differences in the parent and foreign tax rates (e.g., across foreign and domestic jurisdictions).
Important exceptions are, e.g., Clausing (2003), Bernard et al. (2006), and Davies et al. (2014).
4Consistent with findings in Dischinger et al. (2014), we find that there are important differences
between multinationals’ affiliates, controlled from abroad, and (Norwegian) parent companies. We point
out that flexibility is more important for the subsidiary, or daughter, companies.
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estimates may suffer from an attenuation bias. Therefore, it is still possible that firms
have some flexibility to also adjust internal leverage ex post. Nevertheless, our results
suggest flexibility occurs mostly in transfer prices rather than internal debt.
Our findings are in line with the intuition that it is easier to shift income by mispricing
intra-firm trade than relying on thin capitalization (and potentially low interest rates) for
reducing the tax burden. Furthermore, our results are consistent with transfer pricing
generating lower concealment costs because it is more difficult to enforce the arm’s-length
principle for transfer prices than to enforce effective thin-capitalization rules (see Blouin
et al. 2014 and De Simone 2015).
Our findings have policy implications for governments in high-tax countries that are
concerned about an erosion of their tax base by income shifting in multinational firms
(OECD 2013). Our results suggest that tax authorities should not only focus on trans-
actions between profitable affiliates in high-tax countries and related parties in low-tax
countries, but should also scrutinize payments made to loss-making affiliates in other
high-tax countries. This is particularly true for firms that are flexible in using their
income-shifting strategies, i.e., firms with large intra-firm transfer payments, especially
for intangible goods. Our findings do not rule out, however, that less flexible firms could
be just as tax-aggressive even though they sometimes report profits and losses. By antic-
ipating ex ante the likelihood of incurring losses, they can still shift substantial income
and it would be imprudent just to focus tax audits on firms whose income is concentrated
around zero. This cautionary note matters in particular for firms with low transfer-pricing
possibilities, but large amounts of financial capital, that anticipate incurring losses in the
future.
The paper proceeds as follows. The theoretical model is developed in Section II. The
data is presented in Section III while Section IV discusses the empirical strategy and
results. Section V offers some concluding remarks.
II. THEORETICAL MODEL
The Setting
Consider a multinational company (henceforth MNC) that has affiliates in n countries.
Let country 1 be the country with the lowest tax rate so that ti > t1, i = 2, ..., n and
label country 1 as the ‘tax haven’.5 As a simplification, we assume that the affiliate in
the tax haven acts exclusively as a financial and profit center of the MNC and therefore
does not produce any goods.6 All other affiliates use capital Ki and an intermediate
5All countries i > 1 will be referred to as ‘non-haven countries’. Because ti > t1, i > 1, any country
i > 1 will optimally shift towards the tax haven only; hence, there is no need to differentiate between
high-tax and low-tax countries.
6We use the terms ‘financial center’ and ‘profit center’ interchangeably. The reason is that the liter-
ature on transfer pricing often refers to a profit center as the lowest-tax affiliate, which receives shifted
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good Si to produce a homogenous final good yi according to the production technology
y = F (Ki, Si; X¯), which is concave in both inputs. The price pi of the final good is
stochastic and drawn from a cumulative distribution function H(p) with a lower level of
p and an upper threshold of p¯. X¯ represents a fixed factor that we interpret as acquired
technological know-how (e.g., resulting from R&D investment within the MNC group).
The profit center purchases
∑
i Si units of a tangible, intermediate good S at marginal
costs of qS on the world market and re-sells them at price G
S
i + qS to the other affiliates,
pretending that it has added value GSi to the input good. The correct arm’s-length price
of S, however, is qS. Furthermore, the patent rights for the intangible, technological
know-how X¯ are also located in the profit center which claims license fees GXi + qX , while
the true arm’s-length price is qX . Any deviation from the true arm’s-length price leads
to convex concealment costs CP (PXi , P
S
i ), where P
X
i = G
X
i · X and P
S
i = G
S
i · Si, with
∂CP
∂Ga
i
> (<)0 if Gai > (<)0 and
∂2CP
∂(Ga
i
)2
> 0, a = {X,S}. The concealment costs are defined
over shifted income and correspond to the set-up in Allingham and Sandmo (1972), where
a fine is calculated based on undeclared income. This concept of concealment costs in
transfer pricing mirrors the ‘comparable profit method’ proposed by the OECD.7
The headquarters (henceforth HQ) of the MNC endows the financial center with equity
E1 and provides the producing affiliates with the equity necessary to reach both a tax-
efficient financing structure and the optimal level of real capital.8 Thus, productive capital
Ki in affiliate i is financed by equity Ei provided by the HQ and by internal debt D
I
i
borrowed from the financial center so that Ki = Ei +D
I
i .
9 The financial center uses its
equity E1 to finance its internal lending
∑
iD
I
i to all the other affiliates so that E1 =∑
iD
I
i . We define the internal leverage ratio of the producing affiliate as bi = D
I
i /Ki and
assume that both types of financing are free of risk and carry the world-market interest
rate r.
In line with most tax systems, we assume that the costs of equity are not tax deductible
while interest expense related to debt can be deducted from the corporate tax base. As is
income from mispriced intra-firm trade, while the debt-shifting literature often labels a financial center
as the internal bank, which lends funds to and receives interest income from related affiliates. In our
setting, the result is the same in that a profit/financial center can be used to shift income within the
MNC.
7The alternative approach would be to rely on the deviation of the true arm’s-length price only,
featuring the ‘comparable unrelated price method’ (see OECD 2013, and Gresik and Osmundsen 2008,
for institutional details). Qualitatively, our results do not depend on which approach is chosen.
8We assume central decision-making because allowing for decentralization would add complexity with-
out providing additional insights on the tax incentives. Moreover, firms can rely on two books and multiple
transfer prices in order to separate tax-driven income shifting from principal-agent problems in a decen-
tralized structure (see Smith 2002; Nielsen and Raimondos-Møller 2012). Finally, Nielsen et al. (2008)
argue that centralization is the dominant strategy when tax differentials are large and tax savings are
important. Go¨x and Schiller (2007, p. 692) survey mixed empirical evidence, but anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that large, tax efficient MNCs operate with multiple transfer prices. See, e.g., Daniel Kocieniewski
on ‘G.E.’s Strategies Let It Avoid Taxes Altogether’ in The New York Times of March 24, 2011.
9For simplicity and without any consequences for our main results, we have assumed that there are
no external capital markets for debt available.
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standard in the literature (e.g., Mintz and Smart 2004; Schindler and Schjelderup 2012),
the MNC needs to incur concealment costs CI(bi) in order to conceal thin capitalization.
These costs are proportional to the amount of capital employed and convex for any positive
internal leverage bi > 0, but zero otherwise, both in absolute terms and on the margin
(i.e., CI(bi) =
∂CI (bi)
∂bi
= 0 for bi ≤ 0).
Given these assumptions, the economic profit of affiliate i is given by revenue from the
sales of the output good minus the license cost for the intangible good, the input cost for
the tangible intermediate good, the concealment costs related to tangible and intangible
goods due to deviations from the arm’s length standard, concealment costs related to
internal leverage (e.g., due the thin-capitalization rules), and the user cost of capital
πei = piyi − (G
X
i + qX)X¯ − (G
S
i + qS)Si − C
P (PXi , P
S
i )− C
I(bi)Ki − rKi. (1)
Taxable income differs from economic profit in that opportunity costs of equity and con-
cealment costs are not tax-deductible. Furthermore, we assume that no loss offset is
granted when the affiliate is running taxable losses.10 Let p0i be the price for which the
taxable income of affiliate i is just zero. The taxable income of affiliate i can then be
written as
πti =

piyi − (G
X
i + qX)X¯ − (G
S
i + qS)Si − rbiKi, if pi > p
0
i
0, if p ≤ p0i .
The (after-tax) surplus of the financial center in country 1 amounts to the receipt from
each non-haven affiliate of license fees, payments for goods, and interest income, less
the development cost of intangibles and input costs of tangibles, as well as the financial
center’s aggregate cost of capital,11
10In reality, loss carry forwards allow for deducting current losses against future profits. However,
loss carry forwards are not inflated with interest and their present discounted value decreases over time.
Therefore, in a fully specified model, one would need to compare the discounted tax rate in the future
to the net tax savings from settling losses in one affiliate with taxable profits in other affiliates in the
current year. As our empirical analysis later in the study focuses on Norway in the years 1998 to 2005,
the simplifying assumption of no loss carry forwards should be harmless because the average Norwegian
interest rate on banks’ overnight loans was 7% in this period. Furthermore, before 2005, the time limit to
utilize loss carry forwards was 10 years in Norway and as short as 5 years in other major OECD countries
(see OECD 2002, Table 2.2). Indeed, there is (indirect) evidence that Norwegian firms were concerned
about the expiration of their loss carry forwards (see Aarbu and MacKie-Mason 2003), which further
suggests that our simplifying assumption is reflective of economic conditions in Norway.
11In this model, all income is shifted to the financial center. Then, this center uses part of its surplus
to shift income to loss affiliates in non-haven countries.
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π1 = (1− t1)
∑
i
[(GXi + qX)X¯ + (G
S
i + qS)Si + rbiKi − qXX¯ − qSSi]− r
∑
i
biKi
= (1− t1)
∑
i
[
GXi X¯ +G
S
i Si
]
− t1r
∑
i
biKi. (2)
The HQ of the MNC maximizes total after-tax income Π by choosing the optimal
income-shifting activity, i.e., by optimizing over internal leverages bi, and the transfer
prices GXi and G
S
i . With respect to the timing of the tax-planning strategies of the MNC,
two scenarios are applicable. First, the MNC could choose its tax-planning strategies
after the realization of the output price, say, at the end of the year. We refer to this
scenario as ‘ex-post income shifting.’ Second, it could be that the MNC has to decide on
and to commit to its income-shifting activities before the revelation of the output prices.
We refer to this setting as ‘ex-ante income shifting’.
Ex-post Income Shifting
Taking information during the year about the output price into account, the MNC shifts
income to those affiliates granting the largest tax reductions. We can distinguish the two
cases pi > p
0
i (generating positive taxable income in affiliate i) and pi ≤ p
0
i (generating
zero income or losses in affiliate i). Therefore, we introduce an indicator function 1i that
equals one if an affiliate reports a positive tax base (πti > 0) and is zero whenever an
affiliate has non-positive taxable profits (πt ≤ 0).
The overall after-tax income Π of the MNC consists of the after-tax income in the profit
center π1 plus the sum over the productive affiliates’ after-tax incomes
∑
i>1(π
e
i −1itiπ
t
i).
The tax payments tiπ
t
i are always positive for profitable affiliates with π
t
i > 0, and zero
for all affiliates reporting non-positive taxable profits πti ≤ 0. Hence, the maximization
problem of the MNC can be written as
max
bi,G
X
i
,GS
i
Π = π1 +
∑
i>1
(πei − 1itiπ
t
i) s.t. 1i =

1, if π
t
i > 0,
0, if πti ≤ 0,
(3)
∑
i
rbiKi = 0,
∑
i
GXi X¯ = 0,
∑
i
GSi Si = 0.
Positive taxable income. In the first case, 1i = 1 because these producing affiliates
earn taxable profits and therefore face the local tax rate ti. Differentiating the total
after-tax income (3) for the three income-shifting variables under the condition πti > 0
yields
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ti − t1 −
1
r
∂CI
∂bi
= 0, (4a)
ti − t1 −
∂CP
∂PXi
= 0, (4b)
ti − t1 −
∂CP
∂P Si
= 0. (4c)
The rearranged first-order conditions state that the effective marginal concealment
costs for each income-shifting device equalize in the optimum, i.e. 1
r
∂CI
∂bi
= ∂C
P
∂GX
i
= ∂C
P
∂GS
i
.
Furthermore, if the taxable income in the producing affiliates is positive, the MNC is
unconstrained in the use of all income-shifting channels and effective marginal concealment
costs are equal to the marginal tax savings ti−t1. The consequences are that, for affiliates
with taxable profits, the MNC sets transfer prices above the correct arm’s-length prices,
and that the financial center lends internal debt to the non-haven affiliates in order to
shift income into the tax haven.
Non-positive taxable income. Whenever the output price is equal to or below the
break-even price (pi ≤ p
0
i ), the producing affiliates have neither economic profits nor
taxable income, i.e., they are in a loss position. Therefore, 1i = 0 and tax payments drop
to zero. Such affiliates will not earn any tax savings on income shifted out.
For such cases, the first-order conditions yield
∂Π
∂bi
= −t1 −
1
r
∂CI
∂bi
< 0, (5a)
∂Π
∂GXi
= −t1 −
∂CP
∂PXi
= 0, (5b)
∂Π
∂GSi
= −t1 −
∂CP
∂P Si
= 0. (5c)
From condition (5a) follows that the internal debt tax shield in affiliates with πti < 0
becomes negative and optimal internal debt is zero.12 In fact, the MNC even has an
incentive to use such non-haven affiliates as internal bank as long as these affiliates are
in a loss position and their marginal tax rate is zero. We will, however, assume that the
MNC cannot reallocate its equity.13
Turning to transfer pricing, the first-order conditions (5b) and (5c) state once more
that the marginal concealment costs for each transfer-pricing device are equalized in the
12Remember that ∂C
I(bi)
∂bi
= 0 for bi ≤ 0.
13Note that the total interest expense and income over the entire tax year matter for global tax savings.
Relocating the financial center at the end of a tax year will not generate substantial tax-free interest
income there, so that inverting the financial structure (i.e., changing the financial center) at year’s end
will not deliver any reward.
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optimum. In the case of losses (πti < 0), the effective marginal concealment costs equal
the marginal loss −t1 from shifting out income. Accordingly, the MNC has an incentive
to reduce the transfer prices for the intermediate good and license fee below the correct
arm’s-length price.14
In sum, the tax shield in affiliates that report losses on their tax return becomes
negative, because there are no tax savings anymore, but potential tax payments on shifted
income in the tax haven. Thus, the MNC shifts income into those non-haven countries
hosting such loss affiliates. Consequently, the incentives for income shifting are completely
reversed in a loss position compared to a profit position.
Tax-efficient capital structure. The mechanism at play under debt shifting is that
interest income is earned in the low-tax (haven) country and deducted in higher-tax
(non-haven) countries, so that the tax savings arising from the deductions in non-haven
countries exceed the corresponding tax payments in the haven country.
Following the literature (e.g., Huizinga et al. 2008, Møen et al. 2011), we assume the
concealment costs to be quadratic in internal leverage, i.e.,
CI(bi) =
ηb
2
· (bi)
2 . (6)
ηb represents a constant cost parameter of debt shifting. Applying equation (6) in the
first-order condition (4a), we find as optimal internal leverage in the case of a profitable
producing affiliate
b∗i = (ti − t1)
r
ηb
> 0. (7)
All affiliates i > 1 will borrow from the financial center and, due to improved possibilities
to save taxes, the internal leverage is increasing in the internal tax debt shield, i.e.,
∂bi
∂ti
=
r
ηb
> 0 and
∂bi
∂t1
= −
r
ηb
< 0.
If taxable income is negative, the affiliate experiences a negative debt tax shield (−t1r)
and the optimal internal leverage is zero in affiliates that are in a loss position πti < 0.
Optimal transfer pricing. As in debt shifting, the literature on transfer pricing sug-
gests quadratic concealment costs (e.g., Haufler and Schjelderup 2000; Grubert 2003;
Randolph et al. 2005; Nielsen et al. 2010). Since the MNC in our model has two devices
for shifting income by transfer pricing, GXi and G
S
i , it is reasonable to consider the two
as cost substitutes, i.e., the two devices are mutually increasing each others’ concealment
14Implicitly, we assume that there are no concealment costs related to shifting income out of a tax
haven, because the tax haven does not monitor financial flows.
9
costs. We define the concealment cost function of income shifting as
CP (PXi , P
S
i ) =
1
2
[ηX
2
(
PXi
)2
+
ηS
2
(
P Si
)2]2
, (8)
where ηx and ηS represent constant cost parameters of transfer pricing.
Using (8) as the cost function leads to the following optimal (abusive) transfer prices
for the intangible good’s license fee and the tangible intermediate good15
(
GXi
)
∗
= 3
√
ηS
ηS + ηX
·
2
(ηX)2
· (1iti − t1)
1
X¯
, 1i =

1, if π
t
i > 0
0, if πti ≤ 0.
(9a)
(
GSi
)
∗
= 3
√
ηX
ηS + ηX
·
2
(ηS)2
· (1iti − t1)
1
Si
, 1i =

1, if π
t
i > 0
0, if πti ≤ 0.
(9b)
Not surprisingly, the surcharges on the correct arm’s-length prices are positive in case of
a profitable affiliate (GXi , G
S
i > 0). In this case, the mark-ups increase with the tax rate
of the producing affiliates ti, but decrease with the tax rate t1 of the profit center
∂Ga
∂ti
> 0 and
∂Ga
∂t1
< 0, a = X,S.
A higher tax differential makes abusive transfer pricing more attractive, because shifting
income will result in higher tax savings.
In contrast, the MNC sets transfer prices that lie below the correct arm’s-length price
if the affiliate is in a loss position (GXi , G
S
i < 0). This is because the effective marginal tax
rate is zero, regardless of ti. Consequently, income-shifting incentives are reversed as long
as the producing affiliates have non-positive taxable income (i.e., zero tax payments). In
this case, the tax rate ti does not affect the magnitude of the transfer prices. Contrary to
before, now an increase of the tax rate t1 in the profit center leads to a further deviation
from the correct arm’s-length price and to more income shifted to the producing affiliates.
The reason is that the tax disadvantage of the tax haven increases relative to the effectively
zero tax burden in the non-haven countries.
Hence, affiliates of MNCs concentrate taxable income around zero. For profitable
affiliates, the HQ has an incentive to shift income into the haven country, whereas affiliates
with taxable losses will receive income from affiliates abroad (the financial center).
Ex-ante Income Shifting
If the MNC must decide ex ante on transfer prices as well as the level of internal debt, it
cannot revisit these decisions after the output prices are revealed. Thus, the MNC’s HQ
15See Appendix A.1 for complete derivations.
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maximizes the expected overall income.
Expected income of a non-haven affiliate is
E(πi) =
ˆ p¯
p
pih(p) dp · yi − (G
X
i + qX)X¯ − (G
S
i + qS)Si − rKi
− ti
ˆ p¯
p0
i
pih(p) dp · yi + [1−H(p
0
i )] · ti[(G
X
i + qX)X¯ + (G
S
i + qS)Si + rbiKi]
− CP (PXi , P
S
i )− C
I(bi)Ki. (10)
The first line displays affiliates’ economic profits; the size of the economic profits depends
on the realization of pi which is ex ante uncertain. The second line recognizes that affiliates
have to pay taxes in the case of a sufficiently high output price. This happens only with
the likelihood [1 − H(p0i )], i.e., the probability that the affiliate makes a profit. In any
other case, tax payments in country i are zero. The third line shows that the MNC also
incurs concealment costs for debt shifting and transfer-price manipulation.
Accordingly, overall expected income of the MNC can be written as
E(Π) =
∑
i>1
E(πi) + (1− t1)
∑
i
(
GXi X¯ +G
S
i Si
)
− t1r
∑
i
biKi. (11)
Differentiating the expected after-tax income of the MNC for the three tax-avoidance
variables, taking into consideration that the price p0i is affected by changes in the transfer
prices and internal debt, gives16
[1−H(p0i )]ti − t1 =
1
r
∂CP
∂bi
, (12a)
[1−H(p0i )]ti − t1 =
∂CP
∂PXi
, (12b)
[1−H(p0i )]ti − t1 =
∂CP
∂P Si
. (12c)
With uncertainty in the realization of the output price, the risk neutral MNC is more cau-
tious in setting transfer prices and allocating internal loans. The MNC only wants to shift
income to the financial center if the producing affiliate has taxable income. Therefore, it
is the expected tax rate (as opposed to the statutory tax rate) of the producing affiliate,
[1−H(p0i )] ti, that matters for determining the tax savings ex ante. Consequently, overin-
voicing transfer prices and internal debt shifting becomes less attractive if the probability
of being unprofitable, H(p0i ), increases.
In the setting of ex-ante income shifting, this insight leads to precautionary behavior
and self-insurance that can be two-fold. In order to self-insure against a low price and
16We deliver a full derivation of the ex-ante optimality conditions in Appendix A.2.
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potential losses, firms can ‘underinvest’ in transfer pricing and internal leverage, which will
reduce exposure to the risk of ending up with losses that are not currently tax deductible.
In addition, firms being at risk of running losses can choose instruments that allow for
more flexibility during the tax year.
Empirical Predictions from the Model
The main inferences from the theoretical model can be summarized in two main points.
First, the model predicts that taxable income from MNCs should concentrate around
zero since they have incentives to shift profits out of profit-making affiliates and in to
loss-making affiliates. This intuition is consistent with the observations in Grubert et al.
(1993). In the next section, we evaluate whether concentration around zero takes place
in our data by comparing the profits in MNCs to profits in domestic companies.
Second, the theoretical model highlights the importance of flexibility in income-shifting
strategies. If MNCs have full flexibility to decide on income shifting after realizing the
outcome price (ex post), loss-making affiliates will receive net transfers and bear no inter-
nal leverage. In the other extreme, where all decisions must be made before the outcome
price is known (ex ante), income shifting will not be a function of whether the affiliate
ends up in a loss position. If there is some, but not full flexibility, we should observe that
net outgoing transfers and internal leverage are reduced when affiliates incur losses, albeit
not to the same extent as in the full flexibility case.
For the purpose of our empirical analysis, the ex-ante situation is a useful benchmark
as a null hypothesis, since it suggests that there should be no effect from the loss position
status on income-shifting strategies. If we can reject this null and find a significantly
negative relation between losses and (1) net transfers and/or (2) internal leverage ratios,
our results would imply that MNCs have at least some flexibility in making income-shifting
decisions ex post.
III. DATA
Our sample is constructed by combining three unique data sources. First, Dun&Bradstreet
provides data on financial statistics for all companies registered in Norway. Second, SI-
FON supplies information on foreign ownership of Norwegian firms. Third, the Norwe-
gian Tax Authorities (Skattedirektoratet) and Statistics Norway provide direct data on
transactions and debt relationships between Norwegian firms and their foreign affiliates
(Utenlandsoppgaven). These three data sources are merged, using an identification key
that identifies each Norwegian firm uniquely.
Although we do not observe the actual transfer prices, we do observe the direct transfer
payments made (‘outgoing’) and received (‘incoming’) between each firm’s affiliates in
several categories. Thus, transfer payments are a proxy for the transfer prices predicted
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in our theory model.17 For example, outgoing transfers include payments for intangible
goods (e.g., royalties, license fees, and rental expenditures), and for tangible intermediate
goods (e.g., purchases) that the Norwegian firm makes to a foreign affiliate.18 We also
observe the capital structure of each affiliate. This feature allows us to measure internal
debt shifting. We classify a Norwegian-based firm as a MNC if it either controls at least
one daughter company abroad or is controlled by a foreign owner. That is, the Norwegian
firm is a MNC if it either owns, directly or indirectly, at least 50% of a foreign affiliate,
or a foreign owner controls at least 50% of the shares of the Norwegian firm.19
Our panel data set covers the eight-year period from 1998 to 2005, and it includes all
firms except financial firms and producers of oil and gas, which are subject to special laws
and regulations, including restrictions on prices.20 Because the variation in each firm’s
loss/profit positions over time is limited, we try to preserve as much of the original data
as possible. We only exclude very few observations with extreme values, notably negative
sales and negative total assets. Finally, the measures for transfer payments are winsorized
at the 1st and 99th percentiles, while we restrict the total internal leverage to the interval
[0; 1].21
In Figure 1, we start by examining the distribution of ROA, or income before taxes
scaled by total assets, of both MNCs (solid bars) and purely domestic firms (striped
bars). We report the proportion of MNCs and domestic firms that report ROA within
intervals of 5%, focusing on firms within ROA of -50% to +50%. The data support our
prediction that the income of MNCs more frequently concentrates around zero than the
income of purely domestic firms. In particular, 21% of MNCs report income that is just
slightly above zero, or 0 to < 5% of ROA, while only 17% of domestic firms fall in the
same interval of ROA. Overall, the central tendency in the ROA distribution for MNCs is
more pronounced around zero than for domestic firms. These results are consistent with
our first empirical prediction that MNCs have greater incentives to shift income out of
profit-making affiliates and in to loss-making affiliates.
17Robustness checks in Section IV yield results consistent with this assumption.
18We use the term ‘outgoing’ in reference to the Norwegian entity.
19We focus on the Norwegian setting because all other available (European) databases do not provide
the necessary information for our empirical analysis. For example, the Amadeus dataset by Bureau van
Dijk does not contain information on internal debt and transfer payments. The MiDi database of German
Bundesbank reports capital structures in foreign affiliates, but neither provides profit/loss statements
nor any information on intra-firm trade (i.e., transfer payments). An alternative would be U.S. data on
intra-firm transfers from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis that contains similar information as the
Norwegian data (for selected years). However, these data are proprietary and unavailable to the authors.
20The length of the sample period is limited by the fact that detailed data on transactions are not
collected by the Norwegian tax authority or Statistics Norway for later years. We also note that the
observations used in our sample can be applied directly to our theory model because Norway does not
allow loss carry backs and introduced thin-capitalization rules in 2014, restricting the use of internal debt.
2139 and 6 observations, respectively, are deleted from the sample of MNCs due to negative sales and
negative total assets. 303 observations with an internal leverage outside the interval [0; 1] are excluded
from the analysis of internal debt, but are retained in the tests of transfer payments. The continuous
control variables pre-tax income, total assets, and loss carry forward are also winsorized.
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[Insert Figure 1 about here]
In order to test for flexibility in cross-border income shifting under losses, we now
examine only MNCs. We generate a dummy variable (Lit) equal to 1 if the Norwegian
firm i is in a loss position in year t; zero otherwise. As we explain later, this measure
will be our independent variable of interest. In terms of dependent variables, we first
calculate net outgoing transfer payments as outgoing transfers minus incoming transfers
(using the Norwegian firm as the reference point for incoming or outgoing), where transfer
payments include the sum of royalties, licenses, rent, and purchases. We scale transfer
payments by the mean total assets of the Norwegian affiliate over the sample period.
Second, we calculate the internal leverage ratio as affiliate (short- and long-term) debt,
scaled by mean total affiliate assets over the sample period. Using the mean total assets
in the denominator ensures that any changes in transfer payments or internal leverage are
caused by changes in income shifting rather than assets.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Table 1 takes an initial descriptive look at the relation between being in a loss position
and income-shifting strategies (i.e., via transfer pricing or internal debt). When evaluating
the full sample of MNCs, we observe no significant differences between firms with profits
and losses. However, Dischinger et al. (2014a,b) offer a plausible explanation in that
they find the income distribution is skewed in favor of the HQ’s location and that there
is less income shifted away from high-tax parent companies compared to affiliates with
the same tax rate. This indicates that the HQ plays a unique role in MNCs, or to
quote the title of their 2014a-paper, “There is no place like home”. This is in line with
theoretical studies pointing to agency costs and moral-hazard problems between the HQ
and the profit/financial center.22 Hence, we also look at the sub-sample of MNCs that are
controlled by foreign owners, i.e., at Norwegian daughter companies only.23 For this sub-
sample, we obtain the expected negative sign, and the difference is statistically significant.
Due to the difference in behaviors between headquarter and daughter entities, we report
separate results for the full sample and sub-sample consisting of only Norwegian daughter
companies of foreign parents.
The difference between the full sample of MNCs and the sub-sample of Norwegian
daughters is less visible when examining internal leverage. In both cases, firms in a loss
22Also see O’Donnell (2000), Chang and Taylor (1999), and Hamilton and Kashlak (1999).
23The data source containing transfers and internal leverage aims to capture Norwegian companies with
ownership abroad, and thus mainly contain Norwegian mother companies. Of the Norwegian companies
with ownership abroad, about 15% are again owned by a foreign mother company. Hence, our data
contain information about a relatively low number of Norwegian daughter companies.
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position hold less debt than those in a break-even or profit position. In fact, this difference
is larger for the sub-sample of daughters. Overall, the descriptive results suggest that there
is flexibility in both devices – transfer payments and internal leverage – for income-shifting.
However, it would be premature to draw any conclusions before employing multivariate
regression tests.
In particular, the first concern our regression tests address is the potential for auto-
correlation in performance. If losses in previous years predict the probability of running
losses in the current year, firms can adjust their strategies based not only on present, but
also past performance. Failing to control for such dynamics will give rise to an omitted
variables bias. We report the autocorrelation of losses in Table 2. It is evident that being
in a loss position in one year is a strong predictor of performance in the next two years,
which indicates that managers can form some expectations of future profitability ex ante.
We take this relation into account when specifying the empirical model.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Empirical Strategy
Our empirical investigation relies on OLS estimations of variations of the following equa-
tion:
yijt = β0 + β1Lijt + β2Lijt−1 + β3Lijt ∗ Lijt−1 + z
′
ijt
θ + δt + αj + ǫijt, (13)
where the dependent variable yijt is either transfer payments or internal leverage in affiliate
i, being active in industry j at year t. In the main specifications, we successively use gross
and net outgoing transfers, as well as total internal leverage. We use variations of these
variables in robustness checks, reported later.
Our key independent variable is Lijt, or the loss-position indicator, making β1 the
coefficient of interest in our study. Under the null of zero flexibility, β1 is zero while a
significantly negative estimate suggests flexibility to perform ex-post shifting.
As discussed above, the substantial autocorrelation in losses means that earlier years’
performance is an important control for the expectations on performance in year t. More-
over, this expectation can have a direct impact on how a firm reacts to losses in year t.
Hence, in the regressions we include the lagged loss position, as well as an interaction term
between the current and lagged loss position that is equal to one if a firm experienced a
loss position both at time t and t − 1. The interaction term captures the use of ex-ante
strategies that allow for some flexibility during the tax year (see the discussion of pre-
cautionary behavior at the end of the discussion on ex-ante income shifting at the end of
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Section II). In addition, all regressions include time and industry fixed effects, represented
by δt and αj , respectively. We cluster standard errors by firm (Petersen 2009).
Motivated by earlier literature, we control for several firm characteristics in the vector
zijt.
24 Pre-tax income as a share of total assets serves as a performance measure. The
maximum tax rate differential between affiliates within the MNC captures the potential
payoff from income shifting in terms of utilizing a lower tax rate. The log of total assets
acts as a control for size. We include the age of the firm and control for any tax loss carry
forward.
Before proceeding to the empirical results, we caution the reader when interpreting
the coefficient for the current loss-position indicator. Three caveats must be taken into
account. First, since the income-shifting decisions affect the probability of being in a loss
position, and thus, Lijt, β1 can be subject to simultaneity bias. In Appendix A.3 the
bias is derived and studied formally. The conclusion is that the simultaneity is likely to
contribute to an attenuation bias in our main results, suggesting that ours are conservative
estimates.
Second, the interpretation of our results depends on the ability to control for relevant
firm characteristics. Since the data do not contain enough variation to use firm fixed
effects, one may fear that the results are driven by unobservable characteristics. Specif-
ically, we recognize that the baseline regressions compare companies with very different
performances. Companies with large profits or losses can be very different from those that
are close to break-even, despite being on the same side of zero. In order to investigate
whether our results are sensitive to this issue, we also estimate the model using sub-
samples consisting only of firms close to break-even in order to reduce problems related
to unobservable characteristics.
Third, affiliates with persistent losses might be unique and could be treated differently
by MNCs. Running persistent losses should feature a high risk of bankruptcy. However,
in case of bankruptcy, all income shifted to such an entity would be lost for the MNC.
Though unlikely, it could also be that affiliates with persistent losses were set up to
generate losses deliberately. Alternatively, it could simply be that these firms are badly
managed and feature strong agency problems between the affiliate’s management and the
HQ. In order to be sure that persistently loss-making affiliates are not driving our results,
we exclude them from the regressions in a final robustness test.
Despite our attempts to address the shortcomings in the data, we remain reluctant to
interpret the point estimates as marginal effects from being in a loss position. Rather, we
restrict ourselves to a discussion about how the direction of the effects corresponds to the
predictions from the theoretical model, and the extent to which the estimated effects are
robust.
24See, e.g., Møen et al. (2011), Bu¨ttner and Wamser (2013), Huizinga et al. (2008), and Rajan and
Zingales (1995) for debt shifting as well as Grubert (2003) and Huizinga and Laeven (2008) for transfer
pricing.
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Descriptive Statistics
Panel A in Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables for each of
our four main regression specifications (i.e., transfer payment and internal leverage tests
using the full MNC and daughters-only samples). Importantly, we observe that losses
occur in 38% percent of our observations, and that this proportion is remarkably stable
across all four samples. We also observe that the average tax rate differential is close
to zero, reflecting that Norwegian parent companies do not face a particularly different
corporate income tax rate from the non-Norwegian affiliates.
In Panel B, we report the number of observations and the number of observed losses
[in brackets] for each year.25 Due to missing data in the control variables, the number
of observations is much lower in 2005 than in the earlier years. We have investigated
whether this lack of observations affects our results. First, we imputed missing values in
2005 by replacing those missing with the values for 2004. Second, we excluded the year
2005. In both tests, our results are unaffected (untabulated).
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Multivariate Results
Transfer prices
Table 4 presents the main results for testing whether transfer-pricing and payment strate-
gies are a function of losses. Columns (A) and (B) present results for our main empirical
model identified in equation (13); this specification will also be used in all robustness
analyses. In Column (A), we include all Norwegian based MNCs in our estimation of net
outgoing transfers. In line with our descriptive evidence, there is no significant difference
in transfer payments between companies with profits and losses when including all MNCs.
Consistent with the findings in Dischinger et al. (2014a,b), we assume that this result, at
least to some extent, is explained by the unique behavior of parent companies. Thus, we
devote Columns (B)-(G) to studying daughter companies only.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Column (B) reports our main estimates for Norwegian daughters. Recall that in the
descriptive statistics, we found a statistically significant raw difference of -2.08 between
25Note that the empirical model technically starts with time t being 1999 rather than 1998, because
we require a one-year lag to capture prior losses. Therefore, the total counts in Panel B, which include
observations in 1998, as a share of each respective sample do not correspond to the share of total losses
in each sample as reported in Panel A (as well as in Table 1), with the Panel B observations in 1998
accounting for the difference.
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profit and loss daughter entities. After conditioning on the control variables in our mul-
tivariate tests, the effect from being in a current loss position is about -2.8. These results
are consistent with loss affiliates making smaller net outgoing transfer payments than
profitable affiliates.
In Column (C), we only include the loss position variables (as well as the industry
and year fixed effects) and exclude the controls. We observe that omitting the control
variables reduces the size (in absolute terms) and significance of the coefficient for the
loss position indicator compared to Column (B). This result illustrates the importance of
the control variables, even though they are individually mostly insignificant.
In Column (D), we exclude the interaction term between losses at time t and t−1 and
instead, add a second lag of the loss position indicator (i.e., at time t−2) as an additional
control for persistence. We observe that the coefficient for the main loss position indicator
at time t is almost identical to the main estimate in Column (B), despite the fact that we
lose observations by adding an extra lag.
In Column (E), we estimate an ambitious model, including two lags for the loss position
indicator, in addition to interactions both between losses at t and t − 1 and t and t −
2. This formulation should capture persistence in losses and the effect it may have on
present-day decisions, although we consider it to be too data demanding to serve as our
main specification given the lower observation count. Interestingly, the coefficient for the
current loss position indicator becomes more negative and significant than in Column
(B). The fact that the effect of losses on net outgoing transfers seems to be stronger after
we control for more variables suggests that our main estimate in Column (B) is likely a
conservative estimate of the true effect.
In Columns (F) and (G), we split the net outgoing transfers into gross outgoing and
gross incoming transfers. We find that our model explains much more of the variation
in outgoing transfers than for incoming transfers. Moreover, we observe that the effect
on net outgoing transfers is entirely driven by a reduction in gross outgoing transfers
as reported in Column (F), while the incoming transfers remain unchanged as reported
in Column (G). Collectively, our results suggest that loss firms engage in ex-post income
shifting by reducing the amount of net outgoing transfer payments compared to profitable
firms.26
We note that the control variables seem to have little effect on the transfer payments.
However, the industry and time fixed effects capture a substantial amount of the variation,
ultimately yielding an R-squared of almost 21%. Moreover, the variation in the data is
rather limited. In fact, out of the 609 observations, 481 take a zero value for transfers.
26We have also tested other specifications based on the within-daughter variation in tax rates. In
principle, the incentives to shift in to a loss-making Norwegian daughter should be stronger for affiliates
in high-tax countries. Unfortunately, the within-daughter variation in tax rates is not sufficient to draw
reliable inferences.
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The observations with zero net transfers not only lead to little variation in our data,
but leads to concern over how useful they are when estimating the effect of the trans-
fers. Thus, in Table 5, we report results from regressions where the observations with
zero transfers are omitted. Even though the precision is lower due to the large reduc-
tion in sample size, we observe that the coefficients for the loss position grow in absolute
value and remain significant. In the remaining tests, we include the observations with
zeroes, keeping in mind that these seem to work in the direction of conservative estimates.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Given our results above that daughter companies experience lower outgoing trans-
fer payments under losses than profits, in our next set of tests we explore more deeply
whether the flexibility in transfer payments is higher due to the internal transfer pricing
of intangibles or tangibles. It is reasonable to assume that the flexibility is greater for
intangible goods, as arm’s length prices are more difficult (or impossible) to observe for
intangibles (e.g., trademarks and patents) compared to tangibles (e.g., cost of materials).
In addition, payments for intangibles are typically due at the end of the tax year instead
of being a regular expenditure during the year as for tangibles, thus affording intangibles
more flexibility to respond to losses using income shifting. To explore this issue, we suc-
cessively re-estimate our main regression by using the two transfer payment types as the
dependent variable. In particular, we measure net outgoing transfers related to intangibles
as the sum of royalties, licenses, and rent; we measure net outgoing transfers related to
tangibles as the sum of cost of materials. We continue to scale these transfer payments by
the firm’s average total assets over the period. The results in Table 6 indicate that there
is more flexibility in pricing of intangible than tangible goods; being in a loss position
only has a significant effect on the former type of good.
This result is also important since it reduces concerns that our results are driven, at
least in part, by market-demand effects, in that affiliates with lower demand for their
products might mechanically make fewer outgoing transfer payments due to poor perfor-
mance and lower intermediate inputs, rather than through the manipulation of transfer
prices. In particular, if demand were a significant factor, the result on tangibles should
be significant.27
[Insert Table 6 about here]
27In our second set of robustness checks at the end of Section IV, we follow up on the issue of demand-
side effects and decreasing sales revenues by estimating the effects on transfer payments and internal
leverage only for affiliates with non-decreasing sales revenues. The findings in that test give us confidence
that our main results are driven by a reduction in transfer prices rather than a reduction in sales revenue.
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Our findings reflect anecdotal evidence on transfer prices. Following conventional
wisdom among practitioners, it is very expensive to change transfer prices ad hoc, par-
ticularly on tangible goods. In fact, the OECD recommends that such changes should
trigger audits by tax authorities, at least in profitable affiliates. In Germany, for example,
the highest fiscal court (‘Bundesfinanzhof’) decided in 1997 that any transfer payment
benefitting a controlling owner and not being contracted on in detail in advance should
be treated as a disguised dividend and fully taxed.28
However, for invoicing the use of intangibles, there is still some flexibility. In 2012,
the German Bundesfinanzhof ruled that its earlier 1997 decision cannot be applied to
international transactions that are sheltered by a double tax treaty following the standard
principles for ‘dealing at arm’s length’ in the OECD Model Convention. In the 2012 case,
a German affiliate was allowed a tax-deductible transfer payment for management services
by a Dutch parent company for the tax year 2004, even though a retrospective contract
on the management service was agreed upon on December 29, 2004.29
Furthermore, MNCs have possibilities to incorporate some undisputed flexibility in
setting transfer prices. For example, instead of using a fixed fee, firms can invoice licenses
for intangibles by royalty payments that depend on sales revenues at the end of the tax year
(or use a combination of both fixed and variable fees). As sales revenues and income are
highly correlated, variable royalty payments ensure that transfer payments will decrease
when being in a loss position. Combining this feature with a fixed-fee component allows
for ad-hoc calibration if the fee itself can be adjusted during the tax year.
Indeed, empirical studies document that only about 10 to 30% of firms rely on fixed
license fees only, while the rest either exclusively use variable royalty payments, or a com-
bined invoicing systems (i.e., royalties plus a fixed fee).30 One prominent example is IKEA,
which levies a 3% franchise fee on sales revenue in all affiliates worldwide and channels the
royalty payments to a foundation in Liechtenstein (see http://www.thelocal.se/20110126/31650).
A second example is Wal-Mart, which in a dispute with the New Mexico Taxation and
Revenue Department, relied on sales-dependent royalty payments in order to generate
tax-preferred intangible income in Delaware (see Hecht 2006).
Internal debt
Table 7 reports our main results for internal leverage. Similar to Table 4, we analyze the
full sample of MNCs in Column (A), and only daughter companies in Columns (B)-(G).
Recall from the descriptive statistics that there was a negative raw difference in total in-
28See Bundessteuerblatt 1998 Teil II Nr. 17, p. 545. Law scholars agreed with this decision, although
they were pointing to the need for some discretion in order to register the actual, ‘right’ costs (e.g., Scho¨n
1998, p. 291).
29The companies claimed that there was an unwritten agreement settled end of 2003. See Bundess-
teuerblatt 2013 Teil II Nr. 23, p. 1046.
30See San Mart´ın and Saracho (2010, p. 284) for a brief summary.
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ternal leverage for loss versus profit firms, in both the full sample of MNCs and daughters
only. However, Column (A) reports that after controlling for a wide set of covariates in
a regression framework, the coefficient for our current loss position indicator is insignifi-
cant. The control variables seem to be of some more importance when estimating internal
leverage, most likely because this variable contains more information than the transfer
payments. In particular and as expected, the maximum tax rate differential yields a sig-
nificantly positive sign in Column (A), suggesting that debt tax shields increase as tax
rate differences between affiliates increase. In addition, large companies have more inter-
nal leverage than smaller firms.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
When studying the total internal leverage in Norwegian daughter companies in Columns
(B)-(G), we continue to yield insignificant coefficients for the current loss-position indi-
cator. However, even though we cannot reject that the true coefficient is zero, the large
standard error suggests that we cannot definitively reject that at least some ex-post debt
shifting takes place in the daughter companies.
Among the control variables, only the pre-tax income as share of assets is significant.
The negative coefficient suggests, as expected, that more profitable affiliates report lower
internal debt (after conditioning on all other variables). Re-estimating our models without
controls in Column (C), with additional lags in Column (D), and an ambitious model with
multiple lags and interaction terms in Column (E), we continue to find insignificant coef-
ficients on the loss position indicator. Finally, in Columns (F) and (G), respectively, we
report the results for splitting internal leverage into short-term and long-term maturities.
Again, the coefficient for the loss-position indicator is not significant at any conventional
level of significance in either of the two splits.
Robustness checks
Table 8 presents the first of three sets of robustness tests for our transfer payment and in-
ternal leverage estimations. In our first set of tests, we use sub-samples of daughter firms
close to break-even. Using these sub-samples helps to reduce concerns related to unob-
servable characteristics, since here we only compare firms with similar performance. Just
as splitting on tangibles and intangibles, this set of tests should help alleviate concerns
that our results are driven, at least in part, by market-demand effects, in that affiliates
with lower demand for their products might mechanically make fewer outgoing transfer
payments due to poor performance, rather than through the manipulation of transfer
prices. Thus, by focusing on a sub-sample of affiliates just above and just below zero
income, we attempt to rule out that performance simply explains our empirical results,
and endeavor to make stronger inferences that transfer pricing is a significant component
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explaining the differences we observe in transfer payments between profitable and loss-
making affiliates.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
In Columns (A) and (B), we restrict the sample to daughter companies with pre-tax
income over assets between the 25th and 75th percentile, i.e., we exclude the highest
and lowest performers in year t. In Columns (C) and (D), we go further and keep only
daughter companies with pre-tax income over assets between -1.5% and 1.5%. We observe
that the number of observations is reduced heavily in both cases.
The results for net outgoing transfers are displayed in Columns (A) and (C). Inter-
estingly, we see that the coefficient on the loss position indicator becomes more negative
and significant compared to the main regressions in Table 4. Specifically, when using the
less restrictive cut-off in Column (A), the coefficient is more than twice as negative as in
the main tests (i.e., Column (B), Table 4), while it is more than three times as negative
when using the more restrictive cut-off in Column (C).
Results for total internal leverage are reported in Columns (B) and (D). We observe
that even though the coefficients also become more negative compared to the main tests
in Table 7, they are still far from being significant at any conventional statistical level.
Accordingly, we continue to conclude that companies seem to use internal leverage to
a lesser extent than transfer pricing when shifting losses ex post. This interpretation
is in line with both our model and Bu¨ttner and Wamser (2013) who suggest that the
adjustment costs of a firm’s capital structure are high. However, since the simultaneity
bias might lead to an attenuation bias, we cannot definitively conclude that internal
leverage is not changed as a response to losses. Nevertheless, transfer pricing seems to be
the more flexible tool of the two income-shifting strategies.
In our second set of robustness tests, we again try to rule out that a reduction in
demand (which may be more acute in loss firms), rather than reduction in transfer prices,
is driving our main results. This concern arises because our data only report total transfer
payments and not their components (i.e., changes in quantities versus changes in prices).
We re-estimate Eq. (13) after dropping firms with decreasing sales revenue from period
t − 1 to t. Dropping these firms reduces the likelihood that a drop in quantities caused
the loss, which in turn could have reduced total transfer payments, while transfer prices
in fact remained unchanged. Our results are reported in Table 9. We continue to find
evidence consistent with our main results that loss firms make lower outgoing transfer
payments (see column (A)); in fact, the coefficient on our loss indicator is very similar
in size to the coefficient we report in our main specification in column (B) of Table 4.
Importantly, because quantity demand is likely constant or increasing in these tests, we
can now more reliably interpret our results as loss firms reducing transfer prices to shift
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income. Also consistent with our previous findings, we do not find a significant coefficient
for the effect of losses on internal leverage (see column (B)).
[Insert Table 9 about here]
In our third set of robustness tests, we exclude affiliates with persistent losses. As
discussed with our empirical strategy in Section IV, affiliates that are unable to generate
any profits might be unique and treated differently from other affiliates. Table 10 reports
our results after re-estimating our main tests on the sub-sample of daughter companies.
In Columns (A) and (B), we exclude affiliates generating losses in all years they appear
in the data, while in Columns (C) and (D), we exclude firms that generate losses in at
least 75% of the years. These results remain similar to our baseline results.
[Insert Table 10 about here]
V. CONCLUSION
This paper examines multinational firms’ flexibility to adjust their income-shifting strate-
gies during the tax year when some affiliates incur losses. The theory portion of our study
suggests that flexibility in adjusting income shifting has important implications for firm
behavior in achieving efficient tax reporting under losses. Under full flexibility, firms can
adjust their payments ex post, i.e., before the end of the tax year but after observing
profit or loss realization, and ensure zero taxable income. Without flexibility, firms have
to decide ex ante on their income-shifting strategies and cannot revisit these decisions
once they are taken.
According to our empirical estimation using data on Norwegian multinationals and
affiliates, we conclude that transfer-price manipulation provides firms with flexibility to
adjust their income-shifting strategies ex post, while we cannot reject zero flexibility for
internal leverage. Transfer pricing also seems to be the more important income shifting
tool, with intangibles driving most of the flexibility. Our robustness tests are consistent
with changes in transfer prices, rather than underlying firm performance or weak customer
demand, explaining our results.
Based on the empirical evidence, our finding of flexibility in transfer pricing comple-
ments empirical studies that find large effects on the tax sensitivity of transfer pricing (e.g.,
Swenson 2001; Clausing 2003; Bartelsman and Beetsma 2003; and Langli and Saudagaran
2004). Given high flexibility, the anticipation of losses to come within the tax year does
not matter as much for the behavior of affiliates that report positive income at year’s end.
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Accordingly, the standard procedure by researchers to exclude affiliates reporting nega-
tive income seems to work well for transfer pricing settings and eliminates the offsetting
effects of reverted income-shifting strategies under losses.
However, if taken at face value, our results for internal leverage may cause some
concern for the empirical literature on debt shifting that omits loss making affiliates. If
flexibility is low, the probability of running losses is taken into account when deciding
on internal leverage and one thus risks underestimating the true effect of the tax rate
differential by disregarding loss-making affiliates.
While most of the existing empirical work investigates income shifting of profitable
affiliates to low-tax countries, income shifting to unprofitable non-haven affiliates seems to
have escaped the attention of most researchers and policymakers. Namely, understanding
and regulating firms’ incentives to adjust income shifting largely overlooks the scenario of
firms’ flexibility in shifting income to non-haven affiliates with operating losses. Therefore,
tax authorities and policymakers (e.g., OECD 2013) should both increase their focus
on firms whose income concentrates around zero, and scrutinize payments to non-haven
affiliates that disclose operating losses.
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A. APPENDIX
A.1. Derivation of the Ex-post Optimal Abusive Transfer Prices
Differentiating the concealment cost function given in equation (8), we obtain as marginal
concealment costs for manipulating the transfer prices of the license fee and the interme-
diate input good, respectively,
∂CP
∂PXi
=
[ηX
2
(
PXi
)2
+
ηS
2
(
P Si
)2]
ηXP
X
i , (A.1)
∂CP
∂P Si
=
[ηX
2
(
PXi
)2
+
ηS
2
(
P Si
)2]
ηSP
S
i . (A.2)
By equating the two expressions (A.1) and (A.2), we find an ‘inverse-cost rule’ for
transfer-pricing devices,31
P Si
PXi
=
ηX
ηS
, (A.3)
Relying on equation (A.3) in order to substitute for P Si in equations (A.1) and us-
ing (4b) leads to the optimal (abusive) transfer prices in the case of a profitable affiliate
(
GXi
)
∗
= 3
√
ηS
ηS + ηX
·
2
(ηX)2
· (1iti − t1)
1
X¯
. (A.4)
Analogously, we can determine the optimal transfer price for the intermediate good and
obtain (
GSi
)
∗
= 3
√
ηX
ηS + ηX
·
2
(ηS)2
· (1iti − t1)
1
Si
. (A.5)
31Note that, in the optimum, marginal concealment costs will be equalized for both transfer-pricing
strategies.
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A.2. Derivation of the First-order Conditions for Ex-ante Tax-planning
In the following, we report the first-order condition for the license-fee transfer price in the
case that all income-shifting decisions need to be taken ex ante (i.e., before the true sales
price is revealed). This first-order condition is given by
∂E(Π)
∂GXi
= −X¯ + (1−H(p0i ))tiX¯ −
∂CP
∂PXi
X¯ + (1− t1)X¯ + h(p
0
i )tip
0
i yi
∂p0i
∂GXi
− h(p0i )ti[(G
X
i + qX)X¯ + (G
S
i + qS)Si + rbiKi]
∂p0i
∂GXi
= 0. (A.6)
Rearranging the terms gives[
(1−H(p0i ))ti − t1 −
∂CP
∂PXi
]
X¯
− h(p0i )ti[p
0
i yi − (G
X
i + qX)X¯ − (G
S
i + qS)Si − rbiKi]
∂p0i
∂GXi
= 0. (A.7)
Recall that the price p0i is defined as the price for which taxable income is zero. Hence, the
term in the second line vanishes as the value of the squared brackets is zero. Therefore,
we obtain
[1−H(p0i )]ti − t1 =
∂CP
∂PXi
. (A.8)
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A.3. Simultaneity Bias
Our aim is to estimate the effect from being in a loss position (Lit = 1 if firm i experiences
a loss in year t, zero otherwise) on transfer payments and internal leverage in year t, yit.
zit is an exogenous control variable (or a vector of such) that is potentially correlated with
both yit and the probability of experiencing a loss.
yit = α1Lit + β10 + β11zit + u1it, α1 < 0 (A.9)
The problem is that reducing outgoing transfer prices and/or lowering internal leverage
also lowers the probability of experiencing losses. We thus also have the following rela-
tionship
Lit = α2yit + β20 + β22zit + u2, α2 > 0 (A.10)
This is an example of two-way causality, where both variables have an effect on the
other. (A.9) and (A.10) present the model in structural form. The reduced form presenta-
tion is found by solving the system for the two endogenous variables and finding quantity
and price as functions of the exogenous variable(s). The solution for yit is then given by
yit =
β10 − α1β20
1− α1α2︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi10
+
β11 − β22
1− α1α2︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi11
zit +
u1it − α1u2it
1− α1α2︸ ︷︷ ︸
e1it
By introducing some auxiliary notation, this reduces to
yit = π10 + π11zit + e1it (A.11)
Similarly, we find the solution for the loss position indicator as
Lit =
β20 + α2β10
1− α1α2︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi20
−
β11 + β22
1− α1α2︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi21
zit +
u2it + α2u1it
1− α1α2︸ ︷︷ ︸
e2it
Again, auxiliary notation helps to make the notation more compact
Lit = π20 + π21zit + e2it (A.12)
(A.11) and (A.12) give the reduced form presentation of the model, since transfer prices
and loss position are given as functions only of exogenous variables.
In this paper, we estimate the structural equation (A.9). The problem by estimating
this equation directly is that Lit is endogenously decided within the model and thus
27
correlated with the error term u1it. The covariance between Lit and u1it is
cov (Lit, u1it) = E [(π20 + π21zit + e2it) u1it] = E (e2itu1it)
since the z-variable(s) is/are exogenous. If we insert for e2it, and assume that u1it and
u2it are uncorrelated, we obtain
cov (Lit, u1it) = E
(
u2 + α2u1
1− α1α2
u1
)
=
α2σ
2
1
1− α1α2
> 0 (A.13)
since α2 > 0, and 1− α1α2 > 0. σ
2
1 = E (u
2
1it), the variance of u1, assuming homoscedas-
ticity. Importantly, OLS is likely to give a positive bias in the estimator for α1. Keep
in mind that this parameter is negative, meaning that OLS will underestimate the effect
from losses on transfer payments/internal leverage.
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A.4. Definition of Variables
Dependent variables
Net outgoing transfer payments The net outgoing transfer payments to royalties, license
fees, rental expenditures, and purchases, standardized by
mean total assets over the period in order to adjust for
size.
Gross outgoing transfer payments The gross outgoing transfer payments over all categories,
standardized by mean total assets over the period in
order to adjust for size.
Gross incoming transfer payments The gross incoming transfer payments over all categories,
standardized by mean total assets over the period in
order to adjust for size.
Net outgoing transfer payments for
intangible goods
The net outgoing transfer payments to royalties, license
fees and rental expenditures, standardized by the mean
total assets over the period in order to adjust for size.
Net outgoing transfer payments for
tangible goods
The net outgoing transfer payments for purchases (cost
of materials), standardized by mean total assets over the
period in order to adjust for size.
Total internal leverage Total internal debt divided by mean total assets.
Short-term internal leverage Short-term internal debt divided by mean total assets.
Long-term internal leverage Long-term internal debt divided by mean total assets.
Explanatory variables
Loss position indicator A dummy equal to 1 if a firm runs a loss in year t, zero
otherwise.
Loss position at t and t− 1 A dummy equal to 1 if a firm runs a loss in both year t
and t− 1, zero otherwise.
Loss position at t and t− 2 A dummy equal to 1 if a firm runs a loss in both year t
and t− 2, zero otherwise.
Pre-tax income The firm’s taxable income (result) as share of total assets.
Maximum tax rate differential The Norwegian business tax rate (28%) less the tax rate
for the affiliate with the lowest tax rate.
Log of total assets The natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets (in 1,000
NOK).
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Company age (in years) The age of the company.
Loss carry forward Loss carry forward as share of pre-tax income.
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Figure 1: Distribution of pre-tax income over assets
This figure plots the proportion of Norwegian multinational firms (solid bars) and purely domestic firms (striped bars) with return on assets (ROA, or income before taxes scaled by total
assets) within 5% increments from -50% to +50%. The 5% increments are inclusive of the lower value, but exclusive of the upper value, e.g., [-10%; -5%), [-5%; 0), [0;+5%), [5%; 10%), etc.
Outliers are summarized in the ROA categories of <-50% and >50%. We use data from Dun & Bradstreet for years 1998-2005.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics, main dependent variables.
Full sample In loss position Not in loss position Difference
Net outgoing transfer payments
All MNCs -1.68 -1.39 -1.85 0.46
(St.dev.) (10.19) (9.15) (10.77)
Number of obs. 5,455 2,088 3,367
Norwegian daughters 0.63 -0.65 1.43 -2.08***
(St.dev) (8.39) (5.50) (6.69)
Number of obs. 609 234 375
Total internal debt
All MNCs 4.61 4.09 4.94 -0.85**
(St.dev.) (14.67) (13.83) (15.16)
Number of obs. 5,226 1,989 3,237
Norwegian daughters 4.66 3.12 5.60 -2.48*
(St.dev) (15.22) (12.14) (16.77)
Number of obs. 583 221 362
This table reports the mean, standard deviation, and number of observations for transfer payments and internal leverage
for our sample of Norwegian multinationals and daughter (subsidiary) companies. Transfer payments and internal leverage
are standardized as a percent of the firm’s average total assets over the sample period (1998-2005) and winsorized at the 1
percent level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance levels of p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed) using
a t-test. See Appendix A.4 for full variable definitions.
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Table 2: Autocorrelation in loss positions
All MNCs Loss at time t Loss at time t− 1
Loss at time t− 1 (N = 5, 455) 0.40***
Loss at time t− 2 (N = 4, 680) 0.28*** 0.39***
Daughters Loss at time t Loss at time t− 1
Loss at time t− 1 (N = 609) 0.37***
Loss at time t− 2 (N = 528) 0.29*** 0.41***
This table reports the correlation of losses at times t, t-1, and t-2 for our sample of Norwegian multinationals and daughter
(subsidiary) companies. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance levels of p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-
tailed).
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics, explanatory variables.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for main regression samples.
Regression Sample: Net outgoing transfer payments, Net outgoing transfer payments, Total internal leverage, Total internal leverage,
all MNCs only daughter companies all MNCs only daughter companies
(N = 5, 455) (N = 609) (N = 5, 226) (N = 583)
Loss position indicator 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
Losses both at time t 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.24
and t− 1 (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43)
Pre-tax income as share -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01
of total assets (0.45) (0.32) (0.45) (0.32)
Maximum tax rate 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.003
differential (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Log of total assets 11.13 11.49 11.13 11.49
(1.60) (1.44) (1.58) (1.44)
Company age 17.81 14.47 17.81 14.60
(19.24) (14.31) (19.17) (14.11)
Loss carry forward as 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.12
share of pre-tax income (0.77) (0.87) (0.78) (0.89)
Panel B: Number of observations in each year for the main regressions [number of obs. in loss position in brackets]
1998 494 [190] 42 [20] 491 [190] 42 [20]
1999 536 [171] 53 [17] 536 [171] 53 [17]
2000 786 [295] 89 [39] 785 [295] 89 [39]
2001 958 [444] 101 [45] 956 [443] 101 [45]
2002 996 [443] 107 [44] 993 [441] 107 [44]
2003 973 [371] 110 [46] 883 [332] 110 [41]
2004 942 [284] 120 [35] 853 [248] 120 [30]
2005 264 [80] 29 [8] 220 [59] 29 [5]
This table reports descriptive statistics for our four main regressions using transfer payments and internal leverage for our sample of Norwegian multinationals and daughter (subsidiary)
companies. Panel A reports mean values; standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Panel B reports the total number of observations and loss observations (in brackets) by year.
Pre-tax income, total assets, and loss carry forward are winsorized at the 1 percent level. See Appendix A.4 for full variable definitions.
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Table 4: Estimation of transfer payments.
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
All MNCs Norwegian daughters
Net outgoing Net outgoing Net outgoing Net outgoing Net outgoing Gross outgoing Gross incoming
transfers transfers transfers transfers transfers transfers transfers
Loss position at time t -0.0300 -2.813** -1.748* -2.752** -3.381** -3.123* 0.421
(0.452) (1.324) (0.929) (1.220) (1.510) (1.618) (0.720)
Loss position at time t− 1 0.198 -1.259 -1.019 -0.636 -0.527 -2.093* -0.188
(0.380) (0.830) (0.684) (0.541) (0.911) (1.081) (0.388)
Loss position at time t− 2 -0.678 -1.449
(0.688) (0.946)
Loss position both 0.674 0.448 0.190 -0.118 1.020 0.370
at t and t− 1 (0.650) (1.075) (0.930) (1.201) (1.183) (0.717)
Loss position both at 1.753
t and t− 2 (1.405)
Pre-tax income as share -0.0739 -0.874 -1.727 -1.509 -0.883 -0.00938
of total assets (0.203) (1.244) (1.190) (1.165) (1.886) (0.444)
Maximum tax rate -3.028 5.896 7.890 8.103 15.32 2.801
differential (3.046) (7.931) (9.842) (9.790) (13.79) (2.090)
Log of total assets -0.309* -0.678 -0.680 -0.664 -0.695 0.418**
(0.167) (0.422) (0.464) (0.466) (0.660) (0.189)
Company age -0.00338 -0.0109 -0.00184 -0.00146 -0.0603 -0.0157
(0.0128) (0.0482) (0.0511) (0.0510) (0.0721) (0.0138)
Loss carry forward as 0.244 -0.208 -0.241 -0.158 -0.109 0.00642
share of pre-tax income (0.161) (0.414) (0.420) (0.401) (0.550) (0.262)
Observations 5,455 609 720 528 528 609 609
R-squared 0.087 0.208 0.176 0.232 0.234 0.188 0.082
This table reports the results of estimating OLS regressions of transfer payments using Eq. (13). Column (A) uses all Norwegian multinational companies. Columns (B) through (G) use
Norwegian daughter (subsidiary) companies only. The transfer payment dependent variables are reported along the top of each column. The variable of interest is Loss position at time
t, calculated as an indicator equal to one if the firm reported a loss for the period; zero otherwise. A constant term and time and industry dummies (not reported) are included in all
regressions. The transfer payments are standardized as a percent of the firm’s average total assets over the sample period (1998-2005) and winsorized at the 1 percent level. *, **, and ***
denote statistical significance levels of p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). Reported t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. See Appendix A.4 for
full variable definitions.
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Table 5: Net transfer payments. Observations where net transfers equal to zero ex-
cluded, only daughter companies
(A) (B) (C)
Loss position at time t -11.26* -13.38** -15.52**
(6.528) (6.115) (7.092)
Loss position at time t − 1 -0.638 0.0262 1.292
(3.121) (2.550) (3.415)
Loss position at time t − 2 -0.894 -4.357
(3.175) (4.808)
Loss position both 2.907 -2.599
at t and t − 1 (5.991) (5.506)
Loss position both at 10.22
t and t− 2 (8.499)
Pre-tax income as share 0.416 -14.26 -12.59
of total assets (13.01) (11.67) (10.08)
Maximum tax rate 36.86 29.19 19.88
differential (22.52) (26.76) (31.78)
Log of total assets -5.099** -3.881* -3.028
(2.288) (2.218) (2.805)
Company age 0.0326 -0.0280 -0.0336
(0.100) (0.142) (0.150)
Loss carry forward as -2.867 -3.488* -3.035
share of pre-tax income (1.886) (1.977) (1.991)
Observations 128 110 110
R-squared 0.712 0.741 0.749
This table reports the results of estimating OLS regressions of non-zero net transfer payments using Eq. (13) on only
Norwegian daughter (subsidiary) companies. The dependent variable is net outgoing transfer payments made by Norwegian
daughter companies. The variable of interest is Loss position at time t, calculated as an indicator equal to one if the firm
reported a loss for the period; zero otherwise. A constant term and time and industry dummies (not reported) are included
in all regressions. The transfer payments are standardized as a percent of the firm’s average total assets over the sample
period (1998-2005) and winsorized at the 1 percent level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance levels of p < 0.10,
0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). Reported t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. See
Appendix A.4 for full variable definitions.
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Table 6: Transfer payments split on net outgoing payments for intangibles and tangibles.
Only daughter companies included.
(A) (B)
Intangibles Tangibles
Loss position at time t -0.0155* -0.00691
(0.00909) (0.00663)
Loss position at time t − 1 -0.00655 -0.00158
(0.00494) (0.00369)
Loss position both 0.00513 -0.00148
at t and t − 1 (0.00627) (0.00598)
Pre-tax income as share -0.0125* 0.00409
of total assets (0.00740) (0.00434)
Maximum tax rate 0.0711 -0.0402**
differential (0.0500) (0.0190)
Log of total assets -0.00164 -0.00207
(0.00221) (0.00162)
Company age 2.73e-06 8.77e-05
(0.000342) (0.000109)
Loss carry forward as -0.00280 0.000471
share of pre-tax income (0.00188) (0.00243)
Observations 609 609
R-squared 0.250 0.137
This table reports the results of estimating OLS regressions of transfer payments using Eq. (13) on only Norwegian daughter
(subsidiary) companies. The dependent variable in Column (A) is net outgoing transfers related to intangible assets, or the
sum of royalties, license fees, rental expenses, and research and development costs. The dependent variable in Column (B) is
net outgoing transfer related to tangible assets, or purchases (i.e., cost of materials). The variable of interest is Loss position
at time t, calculated as an indicator equal to one if the firm reported a loss for the period; zero otherwise. A constant term
and time and industry dummies (not reported) are included in all regressions. The transfer payments are standardized as
a percent of the firm’s average total assets over the sample period (1998-2005) and winsorized at the 1 percent level. *, **,
and *** denote statistical significance levels of p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). Reported t-statistics are
based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. See Appendix A.4 for full variable definitions.
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Table 7: Estimation of internal leverage.
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
All MNCs Norwegian daughters
Total internal Total internal Total internal Total internal Total internal Short-term internal Long-term internal
leverage leverage leverage leverage leverage leverage leverage
Loss position at time t 0.00547 -0.520 0.505 -1.857 -0.444 0.694 -1.214
(0.624) (2.313) (2.195) (1.467) (2.735) (1.937) (0.856)
Loss position at time t− 1 -0.118 0.381 0.247 -1.881 0.796 1.713 -1.332
(0.612) (2.118) (1.796) (1.457) (2.753) (1.785) (0.810)
Loss position at time t− 2 -1.513 -2.788
(1.866) (2.340)
Loss position both 0.319 -3.862 -3.648 -5.750 -4.605 0.743
at t and t− 1 (0.947) (3.690) (3.133) (4.573) (3.258) (1.024)
Loss position both at 2.661
t and t− 2 (2.919)
Pre-tax income as share 0.358 -3.511** -4.245** -4.406** -2.414 -1.097*
of total assets (0.360) (1.623) (1.798) (1.761) (1.508) (0.605)
Maximum tax rate 16.82*** -0.816 1.910 0.895 1.808 -2.624
differential (3.698) (10.16) (12.04) (12.05) (9.029) (3.428)
Log of total assets 0.295* -0.0113 -0.0413 0.0222 -0.0257 0.0144
(0.170) (0.510) (0.587) (0.595) (0.484) (0.130)
Company age -0.00795 -0.0836 -0.117* -0.117* -0.0329 -0.0507*
(0.0154) (0.0572) (0.0655) (0.0660) (0.0427) (0.0259)
Loss carry forward as -0.334 -0.328 -0.217 -0.304 -0.345 0.0170
share of pre-tax income (0.288) (0.867) (0.890) (0.867) (0.576) (0.452)
Observations 5,226 583 688 504 504 583 583
R-squared 0.151 0.214 0.214 0.221 0.226 0.174 0.210
This table reports the results of estimating OLS regressions of internal leverage using Eq. (13). Column (A) uses all Norwegian multinational companies. Columns (B) through (G) use
Norwegian daughter (subsidiary) companies only. The internal leverage dependent variables are reported along the top of each column. The variable of interest is Loss position at time t,
calculated as an indicator equal to one if the firm reported a loss for the period; zero otherwise. A constant term and time and industry dummies (not reported) are included in all regressions.
Internal leverage is calculated as debt standardized as a percent of the firm’s average total assets over the sample period (1998-2005) and winsorized at the 1 percent level. *, **, and ***
denote statistical significance levels of p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). Reported t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. See Appendix A.4 for
full variable definitions.
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Table 8: Estimations on sub-samples close to break-even. Only daughter companies included.
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Net outgoing Total internal Net outgoing Total internal
transfers leverage transfers leverage
Loss position at time t -6.331** -1.369 -9.230** -9.998
(2.469) (3.131) (4.535) (11.49)
Loss position at time t− 1 -1.674* 0.362 -0.581 -2.673
(0.869) (2.373) (1.175) (3.866)
Loss position both 1.511 -5.567 1.471 7.829
at t and t− 1 (1.458) (4.754) (2.624) (8.824)
Pre-tax income as share -21.39** -28.47 -383.4** -193.3
of total assets (10.19) (20.75) (190.0) (571.3)
Maximum tax rate 6.540 -12.00 12.68 -2.131
differential (8.370) (11.50) (18.83) (24.83)
Log of total assets -0.659 0.429 -1.666** -0.559
(0.546) (0.505) (0.797) (1.040)
Company age -0.00877 -0.0833 -0.0105 -0.242
(0.0601) (0.0752) (0.0615) (0.150)
Loss carry forward as -0.791 -1.088 -0.500 2.400*
share of pre-tax income (0.537) (1.013) (0.678) (1.383)
Observations 410 396 104 102
R-squared 0.307 0.254 0.442 0.511
Sample Pre-tax income over assets Pre-tax income over assets Pre-tax income over Pre-tax income over
between -6% and 18% between -6% and 18% assets between assets between
(25th-75th percentile) (25th-75th percentile) -1.5% and 1.5% -1.5% and 1.5%
This table reports the results of estimating OLS regressions of transfer payments and internal leverage using Eq. (13) on only Norwegian daughter (subsidiary) companies that are close to
break-even. The break-even criterion in Columns (A) and (B) is that the firm is within the 25th and 75th percentile of the sample’s pre-tax income over assets. The break-even criterion in
Columns (C) and (D) is that the firm is within -1.5% and 1.5% of the sample’s pre-tax income over assets. The variable of interest is Loss position at time t, calculated as an indicator equal
to one if the firm reported a loss for the period; zero otherwise. A constant term and time and industry dummies (not reported) are included in all regressions. The transfer payments and
debt are standardized as a percent of the firm’s average total assets over the sample period (1998-2005) and winsorized at the 1 percent level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance
levels of p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). Reported t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. See Appendix A.4 for full variable definitions.
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Table 9: Estimations on sub-sample with non-decreasing sales revenue. Only daughter
companies included.
(A) (B)
Net outgoing Total internal
transfers leverage
Loss position at time t -2.939* -2.463
(1.735) (2.344)
Loss position at time t− 1 0.271 -1.982
(0.964) (2.285)
Loss position both 0.200 -1.199
at t and t− 1 (1.490) (3.293)
Pre-tax income as share -1.833 -3.019
of total assets (1.808) (2.999)
Maximum tax rate 3.651 17.32*
differential (6.817) (9.832)
Log of total assets -0.364 -0.253
(0.369) (0.601)
Company age 0.0264 -0.143***
(0.0522) (0.0523)
Loss carry forward as -0.513 -0.347
share of pre-tax income (0.488) (0.762)
Observations 389 367
R-squared 0.211 0.360
This table reports the results of estimating OLS regressions of transfer payments and internal leverage using Eq. (13) on
only Norwegian daughter (subsidiary) companies that do not feature a decrease in sales revenue from period t− 1 to period
t. The variable of interest is Loss position at time t, calculated as an indicator equal to one if the firm reported a loss for
the period; zero otherwise. A constant term and time and industry dummies (not reported) are included in all regressions.
The transfer payments and debt are standardized as a percent of the firm’s average total assets over the sample period
(1998-2005) and winsorized at the 1 percent level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance levels of p < 0.10, 0.05, and
0.01, respectively (two-tailed). Reported t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. See Appendix
A.4 for full variable definitions.
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Table 10: Omitting companies with persistent losses. Only daughter companies included.
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Net outgoing Total internal Net outgoing Total internal
transfers leverage transfers leverage
Loss position at time t -3.076** -0.122 -2.842* -0.450
(1.515) (2.304) (1.525) (2.421)
Loss position at time t− 1 -1.098 0.230 -0.314 0.849
(0.813) (2.152) (0.729) (2.294)
Loss position both 0.0805 -3.751 -1.018 -3.332
at t and t− 1 (1.102) (3.823) (1.172) (4.139)
Pre-tax income as share -1.524 -1.910 -2.149 -3.159
of total assets (2.077) (2.367) (3.054) (3.231)
Maximum tax rate 6.647 -1.993 5.709 -8.451
differential (8.301) (11.19) (7.879) (10.94)
Log of total assets -0.674 0.0911 -0.752 0.524
(0.431) (0.521) (0.518) (0.458)
Company age -0.0101 -0.0911 -0.00723 -0.0811
(0.0482) (0.0576) (0.0503) (0.0610)
Loss carry forward as -0.415 -0.276 -0.426 -1.320
share of pre-tax income (0.475) (0.910) (0.512) (0.878)
Observations 573 549 504 484
R-squared 0.218 0.221 0.250 0.216
Companies excluded Loss in all Loss in all Loss in at least Loss in at least
years years 75% of years 75% of years
This table reports the results of estimating OLS regressions of transfer payments and internal leverage using Eq. (13) on
only Norwegian daughter (subsidiary) companies that report persistent losses. The criterion for persistent losses in Columns
(A) and (B) is that the firm has a loss in all years it appears in the sample. The criterion for persistent losses in Columns
(C) and (D) is that the firm has a loss in at least 75% of the year it appears in the sample. The variable of interest is
Loss position at time t, calculated as an indicator equal to one if the firm reported a loss for the period; zero otherwise. A
constant term and time and industry dummies (not reported) are included in all regressions. The transfer payments and
debt are standardized as a percent of the firm’s average total assets over the sample period (1998-2005) and winsorized at
the 1 percent level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance levels of p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed).
Reported t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. See Appendix A.4 for full variable definitions.
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